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Dissatisfied with the current state of the discipline of international relations to provide a solution for the prolonged in-
ter-paradigm debates, this study seeks to merge theories to form a unified comprehensive theoretical framework, Grand 
Unified Model (GUM), through theory synthesis of existing paradigms. Selectively utilizing theoretical constructs em-
bedded in contending research traditions, theory synthesis is expected to provide a persuasive solution. Specifically, this 
study develops main arguments as follows. First, a critical review of the three major research traditions, namely, neore-
alism, neoliberalism and constructivism is conducted to indicate that there are certain meta-theoretical deficiencies 
which undermine the results of those researches on the drastic transformation of the international environment. Then, by 
synthesizing modified assumptions of research traditions, a basic framework of GUM is constructed as a grand theoreti-
cal model. GUM is expected to be a comprehensive explanation of global phenomena set forth not in the state-centric 
but in the individual human-centric manner, contributing to theoretical improvement with regard to decision-making 
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1. Introduction 
Ever since the ages of Sun Tzu or Thucydides, one of the essential goals of intellectual inquiry, along with a 
variation of ontological and epistemological concerns, has been to address a fundamental issue: How can 
humanity attain and sustain cooperation? In the modern world, it has become more vital. That is because the 
arrival of globalization as well as the advance of information technology has set off a radical transformation of 
the international environment, where a multidimensional entanglement in the contexts of politics, economics, 
race, religion, and culture coexists. In this regard, despite a fact that increasing numbers of scholars have 
devoted themselves to understand, explain and predict the unprecedented complex issues, there remains 
insufficient theoretical development, especially, in empirically grounded models that generate policy-applicable 
knowledge.  
As is well-known, the history of international relations (IR) theories involves a series of intellectual clashes 
between theoretical traditions with opposing epistemological perspectives, called “Great Debates” starting from 
the first Great Debate between the idealists and the realists, to the Post-Cold War contest among neorealism, 
neoliberalism, and constructivism. Table 1 shows the history of“Great Debates.” To some extent, those 
inter-paradigm debates in IR theory have continued to this day, but little has settled (Lake, p. 568). Jack Levy 
argues that the division between paradigms inhibits efforts at synthesis while it has “imposed some order on a 
chaotic field” (1998, p. 211). Similarly, Bear F. Braumoeller states that the “temporary theoretical convenience” 
of separating paradigms “was transformed into ossified ontology” that hindered challenges at theoretical 
synthesis (p. 242). It may create an atmosphere in which scholars who dare to combine paradigms are to be 
criticized for theoretical impurity. Unfortunately, this means that there is no sound replacement but “older 
conceptual apparatus at our intellectual peril” (Holsti, p. 2). It even appears that all we have at hand is an 
abundance of irreconcilable middle-range models aimed to deal with specific areas of their interests, which 
often causes problems of selection bias undermining the generalization of outcomes. Apparently, we have still 
been unable to escape from the situation, where “no one has successfully integrated accumulated knowledge on 
state behavior into a single theoretical framework that provides a general explanation of the causes of war at 
least in a way that has generated anything close to scholarly consensus on its validity” (Levy, 1989, p. 211).  
 
1.1: The Query and Rationale 
Dissatisfied with the current state of discipline to provide a solution for the prolonged inter-paradigm debates, 
this study seeks to merge theories to form a unified comprehensive theoretical framework, Grand Unified 
Model (GUM), through theory synthesis of existing paradigms. Critically employing theoretical constructs 
embedded in contending research traditions, theory synthesis is expected to build a persuasive solution to 
important questions (Hellmann et al., 2001, pp. 131-133). Theory synthesis indeed is not a new concept 
(Katzenstein & Sil, 2008, p.109). In his study on multinational corporations, Robert Gilpin (1981) synthesized a 
political explanation of liberal principles and practices in U.S. foreign economic policy by linking a realist 
analysis of the international political economy into liberal orientation. In order to illuminate postwar 
international system, Robert Keohane (1984) resorts to theory synthesis of hegemonic stability and regime 
theories. Specifically, this study develops the main arguments as follows. First, a critical review of the three 
major research traditions, namely neorealism, neoliberalism and constructivism is conducted to indicate that 
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Table 1: History of Great Debates 
 
Source: (Lake, 2007) 
 
2. Critical review 
In general, IR theories have employed a wide range of approaches, often imported from other disciplines such 
as psychology, economics or sociology, and grown in size and sophistication to contribute to a diverse set of 
academic researches. Since the range of work in IR theories is enormous, it would be impossible to cover 
everything, given the time and space available here. The major aim of this review is not to make an exhaustive 
appraisal of the contributions of those literatures, since it has already been the purpose of other studies. Rather, 
the goal is to point out the fact that no body of current literatures effectively deals with meta-theoretical 
deficiencies. Based on the survey results done by the Teaching, Research, and International Policy (TRIP) 
Project, neorealism, neoliberalism, and constructivism are selected to be appraised. TRIP Project at the College 
of William & Mary’s Institute for the Theory and Practice of International Relations has conducted extensive 
surveys on faculty members who do research in the IR field or who teach courses on IR at four-year universities 
in various nations (Jordan, Maliniak, Oakes, Peterson, & Tierney 2009, 2014). According to TRIP survey 
conducted in 2008, 52 percent of international relations scholarship fell within realism, liberalism, or 
constructivism approach with 18, 17, and 17 percent respectively, as shown at Table 2. The survey result in 
2014 shows that 53 percent of respondents identified themselves as one of the three paradigms, which is not 
quite different from outcomes in 2008.  
 
Table 2: TRIP survey on theoretical orientation 
 




First Great Debate 1930s and 1940s Realism / Idealism
Second Great Debate 1960s Traditionalism / Behaviouralism
Third Great (Inter-paradigm) Debate 1970s and 1980s Neorealism / Neoliberalism






English School 2 4
Feminism 4 2
Other 12 11
I do not use paradigmatic analysis 25 26
N = 2724 N = 4659
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2.1: Neorealism 
It may not be an exaggeration to say that one could find a nearly endless list of literature within a continuum 
of realist paradigm. Within the realist traditions, neorealism, proposed by Kenneth Waltz, has made substantial 
contributions to produce a diverse set of scholarly research, particularly in the context of system-level analysis 
(Waltz, 1979). The neorealist paradigm shares the following fundamental assumptions. First, states are the 
dominant actors in world politics. Second, they, as being the rational and unitary actors, behave based on 
rational calculation of self-interests, defined in terms of the systemic distribution of power postures and 
capabilities. Their powers among the other nations and the preservation of sovereignty are states’ foremost 
concerns in international affairs. Third, the international system is anarchic in the sense that it lacks 
authoritative government, which can enact and enforce rules of behavior. According to Waltz, this anarchic 
nature of the international system creates the “self-help” situation, in which states’ preoccupation is survival. 
Accordingly, issues of military security are considered to be more important or “high politics” and economic 
issues are viewed as less important, “low politics.” As considering states as being unitary, the internal structures, 
histories, and cultures of states do not matter for realists. 
Though the international distribution of power, particularly among the leading states, is the central variable in 
realist models, there are several conflicting approaches to assess the consequences of a particular distribution of 
power. For example, one is the balance-of-power approach, and the other is the power-preponderance approach. 
The central proposition of the balance-of-power approach is that an approximate parity of power facilitates the 
avoidance of major militarized conflicts. The proponents of the balance-of-power approach argue that under the 
balance-of-power situation, any one state would not achieve a position of dominance over other states, since 
several possible blocking coalitions might be established against the possible aggressor. As a result, there will 
be a short of a major militarized conflict among great powers. The balance-of-power approach is, however, 
rejected by the power-preponderance school. The advocates of the power-preponderance approach, such as 
Robert Gilpin, maintain that international stability is not enhanced by a balance-of-power, but by the presence 
of a “hegemonic power” that plays a major role on maintaining peace (Gilpin, Ch.1). These scholars emphasize 
the deterrence function of power-preponderance. They argue that an approximate parity increases the likelihood 
of militarized conflicts, since it may lead both sides of states to perceive that the likelihood of winning a 
militarized conflict is high. However, under the power-preponderance system, a militarized conflict is obviously 
not winnable for states with inferior capabilities, and therefore, it is not necessary for the states with superior 
capabilities. Consequently, there will be the absence of a major militarized conflict.  
 
2.2: Neoliberalism  
Neoliberalism or neoliberal institutionalism can be perceived of as a distinct paradigm descending from 
liberalism with reliance on microeconomic theory and game theory. Neoliberalism originally initiated as the 
study of international organizations and regional integration.  Since the early 1980s, its focus has been 
broadened from international organizations to regimes, defined as “principles, norms, rules and decision-making 
procedures around which actor expectations converge in a given issue-area” (Krasner 1982, p. 185). During the 
1980s and early 1990s, the confrontational exchange between neorealists and neoliberals, so-called the “third 
Great Debate,” dominated mainstream inter-paradigm argument in IR. Neoliberalism is built on the following 
assumptions. First, states are not the dominant actors in world politics. The primary actors also include non-state 
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2.2: Neoliberalism  
Neoliberalism or neoliberal institutionalism can be perceived of as a distinct paradigm descending from 
liberalism with reliance on microeconomic theory and game theory. Neoliberalism originally initiated as the 
study of international organizations and regional integration.  Since the early 1980s, its focus has been 
broadened from international organizations to regimes, defined as “principles, norms, rules and decision-making 
procedures around which actor expectations converge in a given issue-area” (Krasner 1982, p. 185). During the 
1980s and early 1990s, the confrontational exchange between neorealists and neoliberals, so-called the “third 
Great Debate,” dominated mainstream inter-paradigm argument in IR. Neoliberalism is built on the following 
assumptions. First, states are not the dominant actors in world politics. The primary actors also include non-state 
actors, such as international institutions, NGOs or transnational corporations, which may pursue their own 
interests even against those of their states. Second, states are not considered a unitary actor or “black box” seeking 
to survive and prosper in an anarchic system. Rather, they are comprised of sub-state actors, who project interests 
into the international system through a particular kind of domestic political institutions. Their preferences across 
the international system determine state behavior taking the nature of domestic preferences or regime-type into 
account. They are aggregations of individual and group interests who then project those interests into the 
international system through a particular kind of government. Third, the nature of the international system is 
defined by the configuration of state preferences rather than the distribution of power. Free trade and growing 
interdependence create a harmony of interests, which eventually reduce the need for war. The democratic peace, 
introduced by Immanuel Kant, describes the absence of war among mature liberal democratic states. Fourth, 
states may create institutions and develop shared norms, which play a major role in producing more orderly 
relations among states, and facilitate to reduce structural anarchy to the extend (Dunne, Kurki, & Smith, 128). 
Neoliberalism assumes that there could be a harmony of interest among states which would allow them to 
cooperate with each other rather than engage in conflictual relations.  
 
2.3: Constructivism  
The conception, “constructivism” in IR theory was first introduced in the late 1980s, as the end of the Cold 
War and the subsequent failure of neorealists and neoliberals to predict the termination had set the stage for the 
constructivism within the discourse of IR theory. Drawn from established sociological theory, constructivism 
can be considered as an oppositional movement against traditional IR theories. Its major proponents include 
Alexander Wendt, Emanuel Adler, Ted Hopf, Peter Katzenstein, Friedrich Kratochwil, Nicholas Onuf, and John 
Gerard Ruggie. Generally speaking, constructivism makes the following claims. First, in contrast to realism and 
to neoliberalism, constructivism considers the international system as a sphere of interaction which is shaped by 
the actors’ identities and practices and influenced by constantly changing normative institutional structures. 
Second, the key structures in the international system are intersubjective rather than material. Third, state 
identities and interests are constructed by these social structures, rather than given inherently to the system by 
human nature as neorealists maintain. In other words, constructivists argue that the international system is 
socially constructed, which is consists of the ways in which human beings think and interact with each other. In 
general, constructivists consider the dynamic relationship between ideas and material forces as a consequence 
of actor’s interpretation of their social reality, and are interested in how normative structures shape the identity 
and interests of states. Specifically, rejecting the basic assumption of neorealist theory that the state of anarchy 
is a structural condition inherent in the international system, constructivist theory argues that anarchy is the 
result of a process which constructs the rules or norms, as is known in Alexander Wendt’s words, “anarchy is 
what states make of it.” It is also important to note that constructivists have regarded neorealism and 
neoliberalism together as rationalist approaches to world politics that share an materialist ontology, as opposed 
to their own approach (Wendt, 1999).  
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3. Theoretical synthesis 
3.1: Decision-making assumption 
The dominant form of a decision-making assumption, which neorealism employs and so does neoliberalism 
to some extent, is embodied as the rational choice model. The rational choice model can be basically defined as 
follows: “When ends are given, formal reasoning is the process of choosing the means to achieve these ends, by 
collecting information, subjecting it to methodical analysis, and selecting the most appropriate form of action 
after weighing the alternatives, within the constraints of available resources” (Gerrard, 1993).  
However, preponderance of experimental evidence in cognitive psychology indicates that faced with complex 
decision problems, decision makers do not follow the principles of the rational choice model in judging the 
likelihood of uncertain events (Simon, 1955; Tversky & Kahneman, 1981; Kahneman, Slovik, & Tversky, 
1982). While decision makers seem to make numerical predictions, their predictions are often made by intuitive 
reasoning or heuristic procedures, called representativeness and availability. A well-known case of the violation 
of the existing expected utility model is the Allais paradox (Allais, 1979). 
In this vein, as Herbert Simon defines, it is more realistic to view a decision maker as a bounded rationalist. A 
common deviation from this norm is described by Herbert Simon’s notion of ‘satisficing’ - a result of ‘bounded 
rationality’. Simon argues that the capacity of the human mind for formulating and solving complex problem is 
very small compared with size of the problems whose solution is required for objectively rational behavior in 
the real world or even a reasonable approximation of such objective rationality. While proponents of the rational 
choice model seem to acknowledge the existence of such an inconsistency, there is a lack of serious efforts to 
provide a solution to the problem. In their defense of the rational choice model, those advocates of such a model 
often refer to Milton Friedman’s classic arguments with regard to theory building. That is, a theory with the 
superior predictive ability is always to be preferred to other, regardless of the accuracy of empirical assumptions 
or completeness of explanatory mechanisms (Friedman, 1958). Further, some of its enthusiastic advocates claim, 
“The use of rational actor models in the social sciences is not only, or even primarily, due to its superior 
predictive power; equally important is the fact that the proposed explanatory mechanism has considerable face 
validity” (Hedström & Swedberg, 1996). It is a fact that some studies, which employ the expected utility 
approach such as Bueno de Mesquita’s models have produced excellent empirical results on predicting states’ 
initiation of war (Bueno de Mesquita, 1981, 1988, 1989). 
However, I argue that if scholars are concerned with the accuracy of conclusions provided by a deductive 
model, they should be also concerned with the accuracy of its empirical assumptions. In this regard, Elster 
argues, “it is only by close consideration of the reasons for failure that it will be possible to construct a more 
general account of human behavior in which the concept of rationality will have a privileged, but not exclusive 
role” (Elster, 27). With respect to the rationality-reality gaps, the unrealistic assumptions result in inconsistency 
between the model and the observed reality (Tsebelis, 8). After all, those proponents’ self-claimed supremacy in 
predictive ability of rational choice model should be under question after observing the aforementioned realist’s 
failure to predict the end of the Cold War. Ironically, even judged by the aforementioned Friedman’s arguments 
on theory building, they have lost the last ground of its legitimacy of existence.  
I argue that the fundamental conceptual problem with the rational choice model is not that decision makers 
are irrational, but that the rationality assumption is applied in an inappropriate way. In other words, the rational 
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However, I argue that if scholars are concerned with the accuracy of conclusions provided by a deductive 
model, they should be also concerned with the accuracy of its empirical assumptions. In this regard, Elster 
argues, “it is only by close consideration of the reasons for failure that it will be possible to construct a more 
general account of human behavior in which the concept of rationality will have a privileged, but not exclusive 
role” (Elster, 27). With respect to the rationality-reality gaps, the unrealistic assumptions result in inconsistency 
between the model and the observed reality (Tsebelis, 8). After all, those proponents’ self-claimed supremacy in 
predictive ability of rational choice model should be under question after observing the aforementioned realist’s 
failure to predict the end of the Cold War. Ironically, even judged by the aforementioned Friedman’s arguments 
on theory building, they have lost the last ground of its legitimacy of existence.  
I argue that the fundamental conceptual problem with the rational choice model is not that decision makers 
are irrational, but that the rationality assumption is applied in an inappropriate way. In other words, the rational 
choice model is not a false but an incomplete description of the principles guiding the behaviors of 
decision-making units (Sen 1980). In order to apply the rationality assumption in a more appropriate way to 
expected utility framework, it must be realized that decision makers do not treat the utility and the probability of 
given strategic choices as continuous variables. In reality, the utility function and the probability distribution are 
crudely understood by decision makers as ordinal variables, not continuous ones. That is, individual decision 
makers do not have a sufficient capacity to process information on the complex environment objectively, to 
generate a complete set of policy alternatives, and to order preferences for all possible consequences on a single 
continuous utility scale. Instead, they attempt to understand the complex environment by simplifying the 
information as ordinal variables. While decision makers seem to make numerical predictions, their predictions 
are often made by heuristic procedures, called representativeness and availability. As a result, decision makers 
may fail to choose the optional outcome, while trying to maximize the achievement of their presumed goals by 
estimating the expected utility of each option. Eventually, decision makers appear to deviate from the objective 
decision-making process, which the conventional expected utility approach suggests.  
With regard of alternative decision-making assumption, the notion of modified expected utility framework 
envisions human beings with limited information and cognitive skills make heuristic, rule-based rather than 
optimizing choices, which involves the operation of inductive and deductive processes, such as the tendency to 
simplify objective information based on a threshold with a set of decision rules, the feedback process and the 
binary categorization (Holland, Holyoak, Nisbett, and Thagard 1989; D. Kahneman and A. Tversky 1988).  
Specifically, faced with a complex environment, decision makers are assumed to facilitate objective information 
on probabilities and utilities of a given policy option through simplifying it as ordinal variables. In order to 
determine whether a probability of success in a strategy is “high,” and a utility of the strategy is “higher than 
others”, each decision maker is assumed to have its own fuggy threshold, which is often known as the threshold 
model (Granovetter 1978).  That is, the probability perception can be thought of as determining whether the 
likelihood of success in a given policy option is “high enough” or not. Similarly, utility of success in a given 
policy option is determined by defining which policy option provides the “higher” utility than other choices.  
To reduce the degree of uncertainty, decision makers divide the options into two mutually exclusive categories. 
Once decision makers choose one category, then they divide the chosen category further into two more specific 
categories. As a result, decision makers continue this process until they can select a specific strategy through a 
feedback process. 
 
3.2: Unit of analysis 
With regard to the unit of analysis, the notion of the nation-state as a unified and relatively homogeneous 
sovereignty also deserves scrutiny. Generally speaking, realists argue that it is not necessary to know anything 
about domestic structures in order to understand that state behavior in IR. Any state behaves in certain ways no 
matter what its internal composition because of the constraining influence of international anarchy. Reus-Smit 
claims, “Once the nation-state is seen as a unified political community, it is assumed that there exists such 
homogeneity of interests and identification within that community that security can be reduced to a minimal 
conception of state survival which is seen as synonymous with aggregate individual security.... Political action ... 
is thus explained in terms of a collectivity of purpose among citizens coalescing around a common desire to 
limit threats by maximizing military capabilities” (Reus-Smit, 1992, p. 17). 
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Viewed empirically, however, state should not be perceived as a simple unitary entity. Rather, it is composed 
of a complexity of multiple-agents that act in terms of maximizing values in terms of political, social, economic, 
financial and cultural contexts through interactions. Realist literature fails to show how the action of the various 
domestic stakeholders, such as voters, political parties, state bureaucracies, interest groups of producers and 
consumers, which influences the national policy. While recognizing the integral relationship of behavior in both 
the domestic and international arenas, it is increasingly important to recognize the role of civil society. With 
advancement of globalization, civil society is emerging through the creation and applications of NGOs to 
specific causes, integrating economics, politics, and cultures in ways that has transcended state-border. Realist 
models also suffer from the absence of an adequate analysis of cultural relevance to the decision-making 
process. Scholars such as, Pye, argue, “sentiments about change, judgments about utility, expectations as to 
what different forms of power can and cannot accomplished are all influenced by cultural dispositions” (Pye,  
1985). Williams also maintains, “the analysis of culture is the attempt to discover the nature of the organization 
which is the complex of these relationships” (Williams, p. 60). In this context, I argue that interaction between 
the decision-making process and organizational culture needs to be accounted. Without such a perspective 
within the theoretical framework, there is no way to understand the range of consequences, which various 
inter-state interactions have resulted in.  
As the alternative of the traditional unitary assumption, it is assumed that each state consists of a number of 
stakeholders, which act to and react to other agents on their environment, make decisions adaptive to structural 
attributes as well as other major agent’s decisions, and result in the emergence of macro phenomena which from 
the bottom up. Each agent’s action parameters and algorithmic decision rules have to be defined ex ante. Since 
the past decade, there has been a rise of interest, especially among constructivists, in the concept of culture as 
partly a response to the surge in ethnic, and racial conflicts. While the constructivist studies use cultural 
variables in widely varying ways, they have not provided a sound definition and full explanation of how it 
works. To reach a conclusion about a definition, it is probably to best to consider the cultural theory, which is 
introduced by Christopher Hood. Hood has developed grid-group cultural theory, as a theoretical framework for 
tracing different conceptions of public management that incorporates the influence of culture. However, as he 
points out in The Art of the State, there is currently no general accepted cultural theoretical framework of in 
public management (Hood 24). Under the cultural theory, culture is conceptualized as the degree to which a 
collectivity of the beliefs and values is shared in an organization at a specified time. 
 
3.3: Epistemological issue 
Epistemological issues concern all social sciences, and remain the focus of intense debate in the philosophy 
of science. Some of social science scholars make an effort to establish formal representations of phenomena in 
forms of statistical or mathematical equations. However, there are several instances, in which formal models fail 
to make full analysis. Indeed, it is seemingly only in very restrictive circumstances that a formal model has been 
completely soluble, as individual behavior is complex, characterized by nonlinear dynamics. In such 
circumstances, it is possible to resort to an agent-based model (ABM) as an alternative to formal models to 
advance one’s understanding of complex phenomena. The ability to systematically analyze non-equilibrium 
phenomena is one of the powerful features of ABM. ABM uses computer code as a way of formalizing dynamic 
theories, and employ thresholds and if-then rules, instead of textual forms or mathematical equations. Within the 
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forms of statistical or mathematical equations. However, there are several instances, in which formal models fail 
to make full analysis. Indeed, it is seemingly only in very restrictive circumstances that a formal model has been 
completely soluble, as individual behavior is complex, characterized by nonlinear dynamics. In such 
circumstances, it is possible to resort to an agent-based model (ABM) as an alternative to formal models to 
advance one’s understanding of complex phenomena. The ability to systematically analyze non-equilibrium 
phenomena is one of the powerful features of ABM. ABM uses computer code as a way of formalizing dynamic 
theories, and employ thresholds and if-then rules, instead of textual forms or mathematical equations. Within the 
necessary specification, ABM can be employed to set a laboratory in which researchers have control over 
important parameters, reduce the gap between models and reality and provide valuable information about the 
dynamics of the real-world system that it emulates. Moreover, the holistic feature of ABM provides a possible 
way to integrate some of the contributions of the previous studies on IR as a form of the “grand unified model.” 
In the past ten years, a substantial number of agent-based models have been developed to examine a wide range 




Broadly speaking, the feasibility of grand theory in social science has been the subject of an extended debate 
(Mahoney, p. 459). In sociology, C. Wright Mills (1959), in his argument against Talcott Parsons, a central 
advocate of grand theory, states that there is no grand theory in the sense of one universal scheme to understand 
the unity of social structures. In the field of political science, as one of critics of grand theories, Alexander 
George claims, “I do not believe, however, that it is useful for this purpose to try to develop a general theory of 
foreign policy. More useful contributions to foreign policy are made by focusing specifically on each of the 
many generic problems encountered in the conduct of foreign policy-such generic problems as deterrence, 
coercive diplomacy, crisis management, war termination, preventive diplomacy, crisis avoidance, mediation, 
cooperation, and so on” (Ch. 23). Likewise, Stephen Walt argues, “No single approach can capture all the 
complexity of contemporary world politics. Therefore, we are better off with a diverse array of competing ideas 
rather than a single theoretical orthodoxy” (1998, p. 30). The ontological question here is whether there can be a 
grand theoretical framework in the social sciences comparable with one in the natural sciences. In other words, 
can we formulate a generalized law which fulfills scientific tasks of discovery, explanation and prediction? 
Understandably, there seems to be a considerable rejection to grand theory, arguing that complexity and paradox 
of human behaviors cannot be explained thoroughly within a grand theoretical framework. Admitting that grand 
theory in social science has been rather atypical, however, I argue that chronic obstacles to build grand theory 
lie not in the complexity of objects themselves, but in the lack of any equivalence of the experimental and 
methodological techniques developed by the natural scientists.  
Over several decades, scholars of international relations have attempted to provide an answer for a seemingly 
simple question of why states fight each other. Despite the fact that a substantial number of models, either 
inductive or deductive, have been proposed, there has been no single model which can provide a satisfactory 
answer to the question. In fact, it seems that there is a pessimistic view about the possibility of achieving such a 
model among scholars. As a result, in general, researchers of international politics have focused on “middle-range” 
models. While those “middle-range” models have helped us to gain more specific pieces of knowledge of 
international conflict and cooperation, it has not provided a framework to integrate the accumulated pieces of 
empirical results.  
In search for a framework to unite accumulated knowledge, this study proposes GUM, by theoretically 
synchronizing an alternative decision-making assumption and unit of analysis within the holistic framework of 
ABM. By placing the modified decision-making assumption at the core of the grand unified model, it can 
combine purposeful behavior with a specification of the structure of international system which constrains that 
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behavior. Simon (1969) suggested that, “even when we have correct premises, it may be very difficult to cover 
what that implies. All correct reasoning is a grand system of painstakingly and fallibly tease out the consequences 
of assumptions” (p. 19). In this vein, utility of ABM is expected to help us to derive correct outcomes from given 
premises, since it is capable of deducing what should be observed in the referent system. While each run of 
simulation is valid only for the particular settings of parameters for initial conditions, it is possible to reach the 
conclusion, which is overlooked by theoretical traditions. In light of the increasingly untenable nature of the 
traditional approach to the study of international relations, this approach has the potential not only to generate a 
theoretical understanding of the contemporary world and its pathologies but also to signpost possible routes 
through which this reality may be transcended through political practice. The study of IR should benefit 
enormously from careful formulation and complete control of detail provided by GUM. 
While the study seems to indicate that our attempt to synthesize a theoretical framework for GUM has made a 
promising inception, empirical tests of the model remain to be done. Since a model should be defined by its 
logical structure as well as by its empirical assumptions, the grand model proposed in this research would 
provide only limited explanatory power in the absence of empirical tests to demonstrate the linkage between the 
internal logical structure and empirical contents. In this vein, it is important to mention that unlike most formal 
or simulation models, this model is designed to accommodate the empirical data on the referent world as the 
initial condition of systemic characteristics, and of deducing logically sound results of state interactions. 
Therefore, in the subsequent research, GUM is tested empirically against actual outcomes of state behavior. In 
order to make this model a “bona fide” grand model, several additional steps are necessary to be taken. 
However, I believe that this research provides an assuring first step toward improvement of existing paradigms 
of IR through the use of theory synthesis approach as an apparatus of theory-building and hypothesis-testing. 
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